2. Reasons against this Intention

263. [Reasons of Henry of Ghent] - Against this conclusion, in which the philosophers commonly agree - that the first cause necessarily and naturally causes the first caused - there is the following argument:Note by Scotus: “ Henry Quodlibet V question 4 makes two arguments, which are here:...” ⁹⁶ the first agent is in no way perfected by anything other than itself; a natural agent is in some way perfected by its production or its product; therefore etc     . - The minor is shown by the fact that a natural agent acts for an end, Physics 2.5.196b21-22; but nothing seems to act for an end by which it is in no way perfected.

264. But to this there is a response according to the intention of Avicenna Metaphysics VI ch.5 (95ra), where he means that a perfect agent acts from liberality, that is, not expecting perfection from the product - as the intention of liberality was expounded in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ (I d.2 n.234). One should deny, then, the assumption made, namely that ‘a natural agent is perfected by that which it produces’ [n.263], because this is only true in the case of imperfect natural agents. And as to what is added about ‘acting first for an end’, it is not necessary according to the philosophers that a natural agent act for an end other than itself, but for itself as for an end - nor is it necessary that it be perfected by that end, but that it is naturally that end.

265. Another response too is got from Avicenna, that just as water is of itself cold, and a consequent of this is that it makes cold something other than itself, so the first agent (if it is posited as a natural agent, according to them) will be perfect of itself, but consequent to its perfection would be ‘to produce perfection in another’, such that, however, the production of perfection in another is not its end, just as neither is it the end of water to make things cold.

266. This reason is turned back [by Henry] against these responses [nn.264-265], that if water could not remain in its coldness without its making something else cold, it would not be supremely perfect in coldness, because it would in its coldness depend in some way on another; the same here, then, as to the first cause in its own entity with respect to the entity of the first caused thing.

267. But this turning back of the argument is not very cogent, because, if water could produce a coldness standing by itself, Avicenna would say that however much it could not be cold in itself without its making something else cold, there would not for this reason be a dependence in its coldness but a complete perfection of coldness, from which perfection it would necessarily produce either cold in another or a cold standing by itself; and he would posit the same of the first being with respect to production in the case of other things.

268. Finally, it seems that this reason [of Henry’s, n.263] could be made clear in this way: every natural agent is perfected by its own action either in itself, or in something similar to it, or in the whole, or, by its production, its nature receives being in another.

For this appears by induction in all cases:

For the intellect, acting naturally, is perfected by its own action. Fire, acting naturally, is perfected in something similar to it and its nature has being in another thing in which that nature could exist even when the generating fire has ceased to be (and in this way there seems to be a necessity of generation in corruptible things, according to the remark in On the Soul 2.4.415b7 ‘generation is perpetual so that it may be kept being divine’). The sun generates a worm, and the sun, although it is not perfected in itself, nor does its nature receive being in another, yet it is perfected in the whole (insofar as the sun is part of the universe, some part of which universe is being produced), and the perfection of the whole seems in some way to be the perfection of the part. Although God the Father, in naturally producing the Son, is not perfected in himself nor in the whole (of which he may be a part, because he is part of nothing), yet his nature receives being in another supposit, or another supposit receives natural being.

This divided major [first paragraph of n.268] is plain, then, by induction, although it is difficult to assign the ‘why’ for this major; but if God were to produce creatures naturally, none of the following things would happen: for he would not be perfected in himself by such production, nor in something similar, nor in the whole, nor would his nature receive being in the product; therefore it is not the case that creatures are naturally produced.

269. A second reason posed against the philosophers [n.263] is that a power that has a respect to some object per se and essentially does not necessarily have a respect to the things that do not have an essential order - but an accidental one - to the first thing,Note by Scotus: “Anything else other than God has an essential order to him (although not conversely), hence it seems that the major should be taken in this way: ‘a power that necessarily has a respect to some first object is related necessarily to no other thing unless the object is the idea of necessarily tending to that other thing’; then the minor goes in this way: ‘the divine goodness is not the idea for the will of necessarily tending with efficacious volition to any other object, because neither is anything else necessary for attaining that goodness nor either does it increase it or along with it give more quiet to the will’; therefore etc. But the ‘because’ [the one following the note in the text] is a proof about the volition of being well pleased, as about volition that is efficacious, - the confirmation about the practical syllogism, on which you rely [n.273], proves a similar conclusion; therefore either deny the necessity of each volition of the creature, or seek another special middle term.” ⁹⁷ because he who wills the end does not, for this reason, necessarily will another thing to be whose being is not necessary for attaining or retaining the end in itself; but the divine will has first a respect to the divine goodness, to which creatures have an accidental order, because neither are they necessary for attaining that goodness nor do they increase it; therefore the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to those creatures.

270. Although this reason [n.269] seems in itself in some way evident, yet it seems to contradict certain things said by the arguer [sc. Henry], because he posits that ‘the divine will, as it has a respect to things in their quidditative being, wills necessarily whatever it wills’, and yet things in quidditative being no more have an order to the divine goodness than things in the being of existence.

271. The reason also seems to have an instance against it that, just as the divine will has its own essence for first object, so also does the divine intellect; therefore the divine intellect too would accidentally have a respect to anything that it has a respect to for its object other than the divine essence, and so there would seem to follow that God would not necessarily know any intelligible other than himself, just as he does not will any willable other than himself.

272. The first instance [n.270], because it is not against the truth but against the one holding the opinion [Henry], I concede.

273. By excluding the second [n.271], I confirm the intended proposition [sc. against the philosophers] and the reason [n.269], because the will which is determined to the end is not determined to anything of what is for the end save insofar as, by a practical syllogism, the necessity of that thing for the end is deduced from the end, namely either its necessity in ‘being’ or in ‘being had’ for the purpose of having or attaining the end, -or its necessity in ‘being loved’, the way the end is loved or possessed. We see this in the case of all wills - which are of the end itself - because they would not, because of the end, need to be determined with respect to any entity for the end if such entity was not, by a practical syllogism, deduced to be necessary for the end in any of these ways [sc. those just mentioned]. Therefore, since the divine intellect does not know anything necessary for the ultimate end other than itself, there is no need that God’s will, from the fact that it is necessarily of the end, be in some way or other necessarily of something other than the end.

274. As for the instance about the intellect [n.271], it is not similar, because the fact that the intellect is necessarily in respect of some object does not make that object to be in its real being something other than the first object, because ‘to be known by the divine intellect’ does not make the known thing to exist in itself but to be present to the intellect or to be in the intellect as present; it is not so in the case of being willed, nay being willed makes then (or subsequently) the willed thing to have a being other than the will, and this when speaking of efficacious will, because something thus willed by God is at some time in actual effect. The divine intellect, therefore, is not related to intelligibles other than itself in the way the will is related to other willables, because the intellect can be necessarily of other intelligibles - nay of all intelligibles - without them having a being other than divine being (insofar as they are present to it), nor by this is there posited that anything other than God is formally necessary in real existence; but the will could not be necessarily of other willable things unless these other things were at sometime necessary in some real existence other than divine existence.Note by Scotus: “Therefore can [the divine will] be necessarily well pleased in something displayed to it without wanting it to exist, as the intellect necessarily understands it without however understanding it to exist? I concede that it is similar on both sides, - and then when the minor is proved, namely that ‘it is not required for attaining the end nor for increasing it’ [n.269], the conclusion would hold equally against the willing of being well pleased as against efficacious willing; therefore the instance against him [sc. Henry] seems to be good, because it concedes that the divine will necessarily wills a thing in its quidditative being [n.270], since its proof ‘from accidental order’ is equally there [n.269] conclusive. Let then the reasoning be formed as before [see footnote to n.269], and the minor [ibid.] is proved by the remark about the practical syllogism; which proof is conclusive about efficacious willing (as is plain), but not about the willing of being well pleased; the proof is that it concludes that the will, perfectly loving the first goodness, is well pleased in anything shown to it that participates that goodness, just as in the intellect the first object is the reason for necessarily tending to the second, because it manifests that it is in some way a participation of it.” ⁹⁸

275. [Scotus’ own reasons] - To these reasons of a certain doctor [Henry], in some way thus strengthened [nn.268, 273], I add other reasons.

And I first argue thus: an absolute being, supremely necessary - as much as anything can be thought to be necessary - cannot not exist, whatever else other than himself does not exist; God is supremely necessary, according to the understanding just accepted [sc. ‘as much as anything can be thought to be necessary’]; therefore, when whatever else other than him does not exist, it does not for this reason follow that he does not exist. But if he had a necessary relation to the first caused thing, then, when that caused thing does not exist, he would not exist; therefore he does not have to it a necessary relation.

276. I prove the major by the fact that the more impossible does not follow from the less impossible, just as neither does the more false follow from the less false; and I prove this because, if the more false has a double reason for its falsity and the less false has only one, we would isolate out by the more false the reason for falsity in which it exceeds the less false; with this other reason standing in place, the more false will be false, and the less false will not be false, because the reason for the falsity of the less false has been isolated out; therefore, on this supposition, the false will be the more false and the true will be the less false, and then from the true will follow the false;The argument as contained in the text does not seem to make sense, or to make a sense opposite to that required (although how the text is to be construed is dubious). The point, however, seems clear: if we posit that the less false is true, we are not thereby compelled to posit that the more false is true (for if the more false has lost the reason for falsity it shares with the less false, it has not lost the reason for falsity it has by itself). So likewise, if we posit the less impossible we are not thereby compelled to posit the more impossible. ⁹⁹ and also from this it is then plain that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible. But such a necessary thing as has been described [n.275] is more necessary than any necessary thing other than it, even according to all the opinions of the philosophers;     therefore from the non-existence of any other thing - which non-existence is less impossible - the non-existence of that which is more impossible does not follow.

277. I prove the other assumption, namely that ‘if he had a necessary relation, etc     .’ [n.275], because what has a necessary relation to something does not exist when that relation does not exist, - but when the other extreme does not exist, the relation does not exist;     therefore when the extreme of the relation does not exist, the foundation of the relation does not exist.

278. Against this reason there is an instance, that ‘the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed’ (Physics 2.9.200a20-22), and yet the principle seems to be formally of itself necessary; but the conclusion is not necessary save from the principle; therefore etc     .

279. This instance is nothing, because the proof of the major remains, that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible [n.276]. But neither is it similar in relation to the intended proposition, because the conclusion is only a certain partial truth of the principle (which principle has a total truth), just as a singular is as it were a certain partial truth in respect of the universal. But in beings ‘a caused being’ is not a certain ‘quasi-partial’ entity of a cause, but is altogether another thing, dependent on the entity of the cause. So although the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed, it will not be so with the entity in the cause and in the caused.

280. But, to make this point ‘about the principle and the conclusion’ better understood, some examples can be given. First a conclusion of geometry, that the fact the sides of a triangle constructed in such and such a way are equal seems to be only a certain particular instance of this universal ‘all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal’, - and so in many other cases, the conclusion seems only a particular or a less universal, or one of many things from which it is at the same time inferred, just as if we were to join to the universal mentioned this universal ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to each other’; and although the predicate belongs first, that is, adequately, to the subject of the universal, yet it does not belong first, with such primacy, to the less universal subject. Nor is it the case that, because of primacy in the principle and non-primacy in the conclusion, such causality in the principle with respect to the conclusion is, in the case of beings, the sort of causality of one being with respect to another, such that ‘causality in the principle’ posits in the conclusion a truth formally different from the truth of the principle in the same way as in beings the entity of the cause is formally different from the entity of the thing caused. Now the primacy of the predication is because of the primacy of the terms, and although special terms are not adequate to the predicates, yet the attribution of the predicate to the special terms taken particularly is included in the attribution of the same predicate to the common terms taken universally; included, I say, as some part of that truth.Note of Scotus: “On the contrary: therefore there is no necessary propositional truth other than the truths of the first principles, which seems discordant; again it is against you, who above adduce, against them on Aristotle’s behalf, the statement that ‘the conclusion has a caused necessary truth’ [nn.239, 252].” ¹⁰⁰

281. Second, I argue thus: something happens contingently in beings, therefore the first cause causes contingently.Note by Scotus: “This reason and the two following [nn.283, 286] are not valid against the philosophers, but they are valid for us later in the matter of ‘future contingents’ [d.39, which however is lacking in the Ordinatio and so the equivalent discussions in the Reportatio and Lectura must be looked at instead]; for if the first cause is omnipotent, then it does not will necessarily any possible; the consequence is proved by these three reasons.” ¹⁰¹

282. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers.Note by Scotus: “Response: the antecedent is true precisely of what depends on our will in order to come about; for there is nothing else they can say happens contingently. - About our acts there is the same difficulty for them as for you, namely whether our will moves moved by the First thing -except that you can save contingency in its motion from the First, but they cannot, as is here argued” [nn.285, 287]. ¹⁰² The consequence I prove in this way: if the first cause is necessarily related to the cause next to it, let the next cause be b, - therefore b is necessarily moved by the first cause; but in the same way that b is moved by the first cause, it moves the cause next to it, - therefore b causes necessarily when moving c, and c when moving d, and, by thus proceeding with all causes, nothing will exist contingently if the first cause causes necessarily. - This reasoning was handled in distinction 2 question 1 ‘On the Infinity of God’, in the argument proving that God is formally intelligent [I d.2 n.149], and so there is no need to dwell on it further.

283. Further, and it comes back to the same: something evil happens in the universe, therefore God does not cause necessarily.

284. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers. And the consequence I prove by the fact that a cause acting necessarily produces its effect necessarily in what receives the effect insofar as the effect can in it be produced; the effect of the First thing is goodness and perfection;     therefore , if it acts necessarily, it necessarily produces in anything at all as much goodness as that receptive thing can receive. But what has as much goodness as it is capable of has no malice; therefore etc     .

285. Although there could be a way out of this argument about evil in nature - as was touched on in the aforementioned question of distinction 2 [n.282] - yet a way out of it about evil done contingently, namely the evil that is blameworthy, does not seem possible, but rather, if any such evil as is blameworthy happens, and if from this it follows that it happens contingently, then the first cause does not necessarily cause, as this deduction shows.Vatican editors: “if evil happens contingently and is blameworthy, it is possible for it not to be done when it is done, because if it is necessary then it will not be blameworthy” [Lectura I d.8 n.258]. ¹⁰³

286. Again, an agent acting necessarily acts according to the utmost of its power, for, just as acting and not acting is not in its power, so neither is acting intensely or lightly in its power; therefore if the first cause necessarily causes, it causes whatever it can cause; but it can cause of itself everything causable, as I will prove [n.288] -therefore it causes everything causable; therefore no second cause causes anything.Note by Scotus: “This reason and the following one ‘about what moves in no time’ [n.290] are solved later [footnote to n.290], where the intention of Aristotle is proved that [God] can only be the proximate cause of intelligence and that he is called the ‘remote’ cause of motion and of other things, insofar as he gives being to the first mover [sc. the first mover after God]; each reason then [nn.286, 290] proceeds badly against the Philosopher, as if God could immediately move anything besides the intelligence, one or all, that he causes” [footnote to n. 255]. ¹⁰⁴

287. I prove this second consequence because a prior cause naturally has a respect to the caused before a later cause does, from the first position in the book On Causes [of ps.-Aristotle = from Proclus’ Elements of Theology]; therefore in the case of the prior cause, if it causes totally, it causes the whole of what in the second moment should be caused by the second cause, and so in the second moment, in which the second cause should cause, no action will be possible for the second cause, because the total effect caused by the first cause is already presupposed.

288. The assumption in this argument, namely that ‘it causes everything causable’ [n.286], I prove from this, that it has the power of any second cause whatever, even the total power that exists in the second cause, as far as whatever perfection of causality there is in any second cause,Note by Scotus: “I concede this, but of the way of eminence. The power of the second cause is also required as proximate, because the first cause itself is of a nature to be, as it were eminently, in a remote cause. - When the statement ‘now there is not required along with the efficient cause, etc.’ [sc. the next statement in the text] is taken, I say that some formal perfection that is more imperfect is required eminently, such that the same perfection when eminently possessed cannot be the proximate idea of producing. Nor yet is the imperfection in the proximate cause per se the idea of acting, but such perfection (which yet is an imperfection) is the idea of thus acting, namely for the proximate thing, - which proximate thing is to act imperfectly; the other perfection, the more eminent one, is the idea of acting remotely, - which is to act more perfectly.” ¹⁰⁵ as was deduced in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [n.282], in the first way, taken from effectiveness [I d.2 n.120]; now there is not required along with the efficient cause any imperfection but only perfection, because to cause effectively is a matter of perfection simply;Note by Scotus: “It is not true of ‘to cause immediately’, but this is a mark of some sort of perfection along with imperfection; but to cause first, and as a result mediately, is a mark of perfection.” ¹⁰⁶ therefore the First thing, possessing in itself all the causality of the second cause, as regards anything of perfection, can immediately cause of itself everything causable just as it also can along with the second cause.

289. And if the final consequence, namely that second causes are deprived of their actions, is not held to be discordant, I reduce it to a greater discordance, that [the first cause] will cause both everything and only one thing, such that everything will be only one thing, - because just as it will cause all causables, on account of its causing everything that it can cause, so also in any causation it will cause as much as it can cause, and so something most perfect, and thus all the causables will be that single caused thing, and in that case everything will be one.

290. Also through the same middle term ‘from the necessity of causing and with the utmost of causation’ it follows that it will move in non-time, or at any rate it will change the heavens in non-time, so that the heavens will be moved in non-time.Note by Scotus: “In a second way: it can be said to the discordance ‘that the First thing will move the heavens in an instant’ that this does not follow, because the body is not susceptive of motion in the ‘now’; therefore no power at all is able to do this. The point is clear precisely about motion in a circle, because, if it go round in a ‘now’, any part of the moved thing is in the same place as it was before, otherwise, if some part do not return wholly to the same place and reach it afterwards - when the circular motion is complete -, then the circular motion was in time. So it follows that, if it go round in the ‘now’, in that ‘now’ any part is in the same place it was before, from which it follows that it is altogether not moved, because it remains altogether in the same ‘where’ and place, both as to the whole and as to the parts. Therefore to go round in a ‘now’ is not to go round, and altogether not to change. This second reason well proves that, by not positing a conjoined mover, the First thing (even if it has infinite power) cannot move the sphere round in a ‘now’, - but not in time either, because of Aristotle’s proof, that then a finite virtue or power would move it ‘in an equal time’ [Physics 8.10.266a24-b6]; from which points it follows that an infinite power cannot immediately move the sphere round, and yet we see the sphere moving round. So this seems to be Averroes’ necessity [Metaphysics XII com.41] for positing a conjoined mover (that is an immediate and finite mover), without which the First thing would move nothing in spherical motion, for it can only act mediately, on account of its perfection and the effect’s imperfection, between which a mediating proximate cause is required. Against this. I ask what is it for the First thing to move mediately? Either because it has produced a proximate moving cause, to which it has, by giving being, given a finite moving power, -Or if the second thing exists of itself, the First thing gives it virtue or some influence by which it causes motion, - Or, third, the First and the second thing cause the same effect in a certain order without the second cause receiving anything from the first cause. If the third, it follows that a finite power without another second cause will move in a time equal to the infinite power moving along with a second cause; if the second, it follows that the ‘influx’ is different from the nature of the second cause; therefore if it be denied, against the third answer, that the First thing has motion ‘for proximate effect’, and, against the second, that in no intelligence is the ‘influx’ an accident, the first answer must be said to be of the mind of Aristotle, and is what Avicenna expounds [Metaphysics XI ch.4 (104vb-105ra)] ‘on the order of the intelligences’. [Cf. Lectura I d.8 n.236: “Therefore Avicenna’s exposition of the Philosopher is most beautiful and better than all the rest, as to how many things can be produced without change in the First thing, by positing that only one thing is produced by the First, and so on.”] And then the infinity of the motion is reduced to the First thing, because the infinity of duration of the second cause is from the first cause always moving it, just as the Son is always generated, - but the First is of itself of infinite duration; but the succession is reduced to the finite virtue of the proximate mover, such that for no other reason is the first mover there save for giving being to the mover. Thus are well saved the first efficient and the final end (because the final end is loved by the mover for its own sake), but the first mover is saved only as a remote mover, that is by giving being to the mover.” ¹⁰⁷

291. Nor is the response valid that was touched on above, in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [nn.282, 288], because infinite virtue has all the perfection of the efficient cause in itself that it has along with the second and proximate cause, and so the consequence is that it can immediately cause per se in the heavens the whole effect that it can cause along with the intelligence;Note by Scotus: “Again, the second cause does not take away the first’s proper mode of causing. -Response: its proper mode of causing is to cause through the medium of the second cause, and not immediately; again, the primacy of adequacy includes the whole order of the many things to which the cause extends itself (it is here just as you say it is elsewhere [I d.28 q.3 n.11] about the primacy of the three persons to the essence, and about the other immediacy of the first person to the essence), and then the first cause, when it is posited, is in proximate potency to the second, and then it acts as much as it can act.” ¹⁰⁸ therefore it also causes, if it acts necessarily, whatever it is capable of, - and further, if it causes immediately, then it also causes change in non-time, because an infinite power, acting according to the utmost of its power, cannot act in time; and if so, then there is no generation and corruption in the things down here, which is contrary to the philosophers; therefore, the premises from which these conclusions follow are false according to the Philosophers.